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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

Case No. 990520-CA

:
Priority No. 2

MICHAEL WHITEMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction of criminal homicide, murder, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for a new trial
based upon newly discovered evidence?
Standard of Review: "A trial court has a wide range of discretion in
determining whether newly discovered evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial. We
will uphold the trial court's decision if it is within the limits of reasonability." State v.
Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).

Issue 2: Was the trial court required to instruct the jury on a lesser-included
offense when defendant expressly declined to request such an instruction?
Standard of Review: Defendant's failure to object to the jury instructions and
his explicit rejection of a lesser-included instruction waives any challenge to the
instructions on appeal. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995)
("Because defendant failed to object to the instruction at trial, we can reach the issue
only to avoid manifest injustice. However, the manifest injustice exception has no
application in cases in which the defendant invited the very error complained of on
appeal/').
Issue 3: Was defendant's counsel ineffective in failing to conduct a proper
investigation, request a lesser-included instruction, present mitigating evidence, or
adequately cross-examine witnesses?
Standard of Review: "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed
question of law and fact." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) {citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)). In this case, the trial court ruled
on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a motion for a
new trial. "[W]hen a trial court has heard a motion for a new trial based on an
ineffective assistance claim, an appellate court will not set aside the findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990).

2

Issue 4: Was defendant denied his constitutional right to due process because of
the state's failure to provide discovery?
Standard of Review: The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new
trial based upon an alleged failure to provide discovery is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,128, 979 P.2d 799.
Issue 5: Is defendant's conviction supported by sufficient evidence?
Standard of Review: In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant
"'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support
the verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App. 305,1 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citation
omitted) {quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). This Court
"will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is 'so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt" that the defendant committed the crime.'" State v. Harley, 1999
UT App. 197,19, 982 P.2d 1145 (quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah
1994) and State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The issues raised in this appeal do not require consideration of the text of any
constitutional provisions, statutes or rules.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 29, 1993, defendant was charged with one count of criminal homicide,
murder, and was later convicted by a jury. Defendant was sentenced to a term of five
years to life on November 22, 1993 (R.233). Defendant filed a motion for new trial
(R.236). A hearing on this motion was continued several times for substitution of
counsel, to obtain a trial transcript, and for additional briefing of an amended motion
for new trial, and a motion for resentencing. Following a hearing on March 10, 1997,
these motions were denied by the trial court (R.1041).
Defendant appealed (R.1032), but a transcript of his sentencing hearing could
not be produced (R.1051). The Supreme Court therefore remanded the case to the trial
court to hold another sentencing hearing (R.1059). Following remand, defendant filed
a motion to reduce his conviction from criminal homicide to manslaughter, a second
degree felony (R.1079), and a renewed motion for new trial (R.1083). At a sentencing
hearing held on April 5, 1999, the trial court denied these motions and again sentenced
defendant to a prison term of five years to life (R. 1256:70, 1241). Defendant timely
appealed (R. 1242).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April, 1993, defendant had been homeless for several years, including the
preceding two years he had spent living in Salt Lake City (R. 1253:63). Defendant
spent much of his time downtown in Pioneer Park (R. 1253:69).
4

At about 8:30 a.m. on April 26, 1993, defendant went to the Expomart building
in downtown Salt Lake City, where the social services office was located (R. 1251:177).
A security officer, Harry Lee, and a social services supervisor, Vicky Green, were
smoking outside the social services office when defendant approached and started
talking to them (R. 1251:178). Lee knew defendant because he had talked with him
several times before (R. 1251:177). On this occasion, defendant told Lee that he was
just going to pick up his knife, so he did not know if he would have time to see his
caseworker at social services (R. 1251:179). Defendant said that he "had this problem
at the park that he was going to get straight after he got his knife." Id.
Several hours later, defendant was talking with an acquaintance, Clifton Jones,
who was seated at a bench in the central area of Pioneer Park (R. 1253:91). An
Hispanic male named Alex Gomez approached, and defendant became involved in a
heated argument with him1 (R. 1252:160, 165, 169).
Gomez did not appear to be armed with any weapon (R. 1252:164). Defendant
was armed with a large knife that he carried in plain view in a sheath attached to his
belt (R. 1252:163).

1

Gomez was known by several names, and is referred to in the transcript by
various people as Gomez (R. 1252:191, 1253:16, 23), Ramirez (R. 1252:159) and Lopez
(R. 1253:60, 152).
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Both defendant and Gomez had been drinking (R. 1253:93), and made derogatory
and provocative comments to each other (R. 1252:165). At one point, defendant told
Jones that he was going to "knock [Gomez] down," and Jones heard Gomez make a
similar threat to defendant (R. 1252:168-69). Jones felt that the argument would likely
escalate into a fight, and asked defendant and Gomez to "take their argument
somewhere else" (R. 1252:161). Defendant and Gomez then left the area, continuing
their argument, but then splitting up (R. 1252:180-81).
Defendant walked toward the south side of the park and sat in his customary spot
near some trees. He sat next to a friend, with whom he began sharing a drink
(R. 1253:101-02). Defendant took his knife out of the sheath and put it on the ground
(R. 1253:103). A group of defendant's friends were standing close by, within a few feet
(R. 1253:101-02, 164-65).
Gomez, accompanied by two other Hispanic males, approached the standing
group of defendant's friends, and a heated argument ensued between the two groups.
There was some pushing and shoving, which escalated and became more intense,
although the two men accompanying Gomez mostly stood back (R.1251:251-52,
1253:168). Neither Gomez nor the other two Hispanics appeared to be armed
(1253:169).
At some point during this dispute, Gomez made a comment to defendant, and
defendant and his friend stood up (R. 1253:170). Defendant took a couple of steps
6

forward, and Gomez responded by approaching defendant (R. 1251:223-24, 1253:17071). Defendant stepped toward Gomez, raising his fists (R. 1251:224, 1253:174). The
other two Hispanics did not approach defendant with Gomez, and were not close by at
this point (R. 1251:263). Gomez hit defendant in the face with his fist, knocking
defendant back (R. 1251:226). Defendant then reached down to the ground, picked up
his knife, and moved toward Gomez (1251:215, 226). Gomez raised his empty hands,
stepping back three or four feet. Id. Defendant took several steps forward with the
knife and stabbed Gomez deeply in the chest (R. 1251:232-33). Gomez died from this
wound (R. 1252:13).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that the "new evidence" defendant has produced is insufficient to warrant a new
trial. Defendant's evidence regarding the victim's alleged gang membership is
insufficient to justify a new trial because it does nothing more than add a name,
"Surenos," to the extensive testimony presented at trial that Hispanic drug dealers were
violent and operated in small groups to provide backup during drug deals.
The proposed additional testimony likewise is not significant. The record fully
supports the trial court's finding that the testimony of Julian Valdez is cumulative, not
credible, and actually supports the State's case. The trial court also found that
defendant failed to present admissible evidence of what Gilmar Pinelo would say if he
7

were to testify, and the statements which defendant asserts Pinelo made in a hearsay
conversation with defendant are contradicted by the record.
Defendant's allegation that new evidence exists of a deal between the prosecutor
and one of the State's witnesses is insufficient to warrant a new trial because defendant
has failed to provide any evidence of such a deal, and the record shows that no such
deal was ever made.
Point II. Defendant's assertion that he requested a jury instruction on a lesserincluded offense is contradicted by the record, which shows that defendant and his
counsel made a well-considered decision not to ask for such an instruction.
Defendant's explicit acknowledgment to the trial court that no lesser-included
instruction should be given precludes appellate review of this issue.
Further, it was not error for the court to accept defendant's decision not to
instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. Defendant made a reasonable strategic
decision to force the jury to either convict defendant of the greater offense or acquit
him altogether.
Point III. Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Defendant
has failed to point out investigative leads that his attorneys failed to pursue, and has not
produced any significant evidence that his attorneys unreasonably failed to uncover.
Defendant's attorneys fully considered the issue of whether to request a lesser-included
instruction, and consulted with defendant in making this decision. The trial court found
8

that defendant's decision not to request the instruction was a reasonable strategic
choice. Defendant has failed to produce any evidence of an alleged mental deficiency,
or show that a defense based upon such a deficiency was the only reasonable option.
Defendant has likewise failed to produce any evidence that his attorneys failed to
properly cross-examine witnesses, instead only speculating about discrepancies in
testimony that are not evident in the record.
Point IV. There is no evidence that the prosecutor violated his pre-trial duty to
disclose all reasonably exculpatory evidence. Defendant's attorneys acknowledged that
the prosecutor disclosed to them all reports, transcripts, and tape recordings of
interviews. Defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor failed to disclose to
defendant any evidence, let alone that the prosecutor withheld "constitutionally
significant" evidence which would have resulted in a reasonable probability of an
acquittal.
Point V. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant recites only a
limited version of the evidence supporting his theory of self-defense. He has therefore
failed to marshal the evidence in support of his conviction, and the court should decline
to consider this claim.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AS
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE THAT
WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN ACQUITTAL ON RETRIAL
Defendant asserts that, since his trial, he has found sufficient new evidence to
justify nullifying the jury's verdict and granting him a new trial. Brief of Appellant, pp.
15-23. The standard for granting a new trial based upon new evidence is a high one:
The legal standard to be applied when considering a motion for a new
trial based on newly-discovered evidence is that the moving party must
show that the evidence satisfies the following factors: (i) it could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial; (ii)
it is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result
probable on retrial.
State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, 1 5, 984 P.2d 975 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,
793 (Utah 1991) and State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (1969)). Here, the trial court
fully considered defendant's proffered new evidence, and found that it was insufficient
to warrant a new trial because it was not probable that a different verdict would result if
it were presented (R. 1255:89) (Addendum A).
The trial court's finding that defendant's proffered new evidence would not
result in a different verdict on retrial is reviewed with great deference on appeal. "A
trial court has a wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered
evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial. We will uphold the trial court's decision if it
10

is within the limits of reasonability." State v. Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App.
1994) (citations omitted). See also James, 819 P.2d at 793 ("Trial judges are given a
wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered evidence or errors
which occurred within a trial merit the grant of a new trial. We assume that the trial
court exercised proper discretion unless the record clearly shows the contrary.").2
In support of his motion for a new trial, defendant claims that he has uncovered
three types of new evidence: (a) evidence of the victim's membership in a specific
street gang; (b) testimony from two additional witnesses alleged to have been present in
the park on the day of the murder; and (c) evidence regarding the post-trial disposition
of a state witness's DUI offense. The trial court properly found that none of this
evidence is sufficient to justify a new trial.

2

In addressing the standard of review, defendant asserts that his motion for a
new trial presents a mixed question of fact and law, and that the trial court's ruling is
only entitled to "some deference," citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah
1994). However, Pena provides only a general discussion of the broad range of
appellate review of different issues, and does not imply a lesser level of deference in
reviewing a trial court's resolution of a motion for new trial based upon new evidence.
Defendant does not dispute that the trial court applied the correct legal standard in
ruling on his motion, and alleges error only in the court's evaluation of whether the
new evidence is likely to result in a different verdict on retrial. The trial court is given
"a wide range of discretion" in ruling on this factual issue, as noted above. See Penay
869 P.2d at 938 ("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a decision by
the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence.").
11

A. Evidence of the victim's alleged gang membership.
Defendant claims that there is new evidence that the victim was a member of a
street gang named "Surenos." Brief of Appellant, pp. 8, 18. However, the evidence
cited by defendant does not directly relate to the victim's behavior, and is entirely
cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial concerning defendant's association with
other Hispanics at the park.
As new evidence of the victim's gang membership, defendant cites to the fact
that the victim had tattoos associated with gang membership. However, the existence
of these tattoos is not new evidence, since the medical report documenting their
existence was known prior to trial and disclosed to defendant. See Affidavit of Mark
Moffat, 1 12 (R.887) (Addendum C).
Accordingly, the only "new" evidence submitted on this issue by defendant is
the affidavit of Chuck Gilbert, a member of the Salt Lake City Metro Gang Unit, which
implies a connection between the victim's tattoos and the Surenos gang. Gilbert's
affidavit indicates that this gang was active in the early 1990fs, but does not offer any
specific evidence about the victim in this case, or about extent of the victim's
involvement in the Surenos gang in 1993.3 Indeed, defendant stipulated that Gilbert

3

In fact, any implication from the tattoo and Gilbert's affidavit that the victim
was an active member of the Surenos gang is directly contradicted by defendant's other
proffered "new" evidence, the statements of Julian Valdez. In his interviews with
(continued...)
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was not a member of the Metro Gang Unit in 1993, and had never even seen gang
members in Pioneer Park (R. 1255:6). Gilbert's affidavit does not appear to be
admissible evidence, as it reflects his speculation about what he thought gang activity
might have been in 1993, based upon his later involvement in the Metro Gang Unit.
Id. See State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72 , 1 17, 984 P.2d 975 (hearing on request for new
trial must be held only if new admissible evidence is found).
In any event, the proffered evidence concerning the Surenos gang is cumulative.
The only "new" evidence offered through the testimony of Officer Chuck Gilbert is
that the street gang associated with the victim's tattoos was violent, sold drugs, and
operated in groups of three to five people to provide backup during drug deals. Gilbert
Affidavit, 11 12-15 (R.794-95). The behavior of the Hispanic groups in the park was
repeatedly described in similar ways by defendant, two other defense witnesses, and
one of the State's own witnesses. This testimony therefore adds nothing significant to
the evidence presented at trial.
Defendant himself testified extensively concerning the organized violence and
drug dealing by the victim and other Hispanics at the park. Defendant testified that

3

(...continued)
defendant's counsel and investigators, Valdez states that the victim had no organization
to back him up, and was forced to go around the park pleading for help from people,
like Valdez, whom he hardly even knew. See discussion of Valdez evidence, infra at
pp. 20-22.
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there were violent drug dealers in the park and that they were mostly "Mexican
nationals" (R. 1253:73). These Hispanics controlled the drug trade in the park
(R. 1253:77), and would congregate next to the park under the Fourth South viaduct.
Id. Defendant further testified that the Hispanics would sell drugs in groups of two,
three, four, and five (R. 1253:78), and that the purpose of these small groups was to
provide backup during drug transactions (R. 1253:78-79). Defendant also testified that
the Hispanics were well organized and tightly bonded together (R. 1253:82-83).
Defendant's testimony regarding the behavior of Hispanics in the park was
corroborated by other witnesses. Dale Olsen testified that he was in the park often, and
described the actions of Hispanics in the park. He testified that most of the Hispanics
were involved in drug sales, and that they worked in groups of three. Olsen further
testified that when a Hispanic gets involved in a fight with a white person, the
Hispanics all "gang up" and badly injure the white person (R. 1253:195). He testified
that the Hispanics were "always in groups" and that they usually had weapons
(R. 1253:203). Olsen also accepted defense counsel's characterization of the group of
Hispanics who chased defendant following the stabbing as a "gang" (R. 1253:201-02).
Another defense witness, Mitchell Crane, testified similarly. According to
Crane, the Hispanics controlled the drug trade, and have "got the run of the park"
(R. 1253:218). When the Hispanics want to make a "hit" on someone, "one guy will
whistle and they will come from all over the park to take somebody." Id. Crane also
14

testified that the victim traveled around the park with two or three other people
(R. 1253:222), and that the Hispanics were known to protect each other (R. 1253:229).
Crane testified that the Hispanics engage in violence in order to protect their territory
for drug dealing (R. 1253:232-33), or simply because they are angry at someone
(R. 1253:234).
Even one of the state's witnesses, Clifton Jones, testified to the organized,
violent behavior of the Hispanics in the park. Jones described the Hispanics in the park
as "clannish," (R. 1252:192) and testified that they operated in groups of three while
selling drugs (R. 1252:194-95). Jones testified that if someone gets in a fight with one
Hispanic, he ends up fighting them all: "what we call [it] is gang-banging"
(R. 1252:197). Jones also described the violent nature of the Hispanic groups in the
park, testifying as to the types of weapons they carried and their willingness to use
them (R. 1252:216-18).
Accordingly, the limited general facts about the Surenos gang contained in the
speculative affidavit of Chuck Gilbert were more fully and authoritatively testified to by
several witnesses at trial who hadfirst-handknowledge of the victim and his Hispanic
associates at the park. In contrast to Gilbert's general understanding of the behavior of
a particular street gang (apparently based upon the contents of a pamphlet), the
testimony regarding the behavior of the Hispanics at the park presented by the trial
witnesses was far more relevant to the issue at trial: whether defendant reasonably
15

acted in self-defense based upon his understanding of the danger posed by the victim
and his associates. Whether the victim had, at some point, some unknown level of
association with a specific street gang, the existence of which was unknown to
defendant at the time, is of only marginal relevance to this issue.
Ultimately, the only fact added by the evidence of the tattoo and the Gilbert
affidavit is that defendant now seeks to put a name, "Surenos," to the Hispanic drug
dealers that the witnesses all testified operated at the park. The trial court rejected
defendant's argument that this evidence was significant, finding that the jury's verdict
was based upon its acceptance of the evidence that the victim "backed up with his
hands up, open palms" at the time defendant stabbed him (R. 1256:69-70) (Addendum
B). The addition of a name for the Hispanic group at the park does nothing to
undermine this fundamental evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that this evidence was not likely to have changed the jury's verdict.
B. Additional Eyewitness Testimony.
In further support of his motion for a new trial, defendant cited possible
testimony from two witnesses alleged to have been at Pioneer Park on the day of the
stabbing. The trial court was correct in finding that nothing in the proposed testimony
of these witnesses is significant enough to warrant a new trial.
Testimony of Julian Valdez. Julian Valdez was in jail during the months
following defendant's trial, and was interviewed on two separate occasions by
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investigators from the public defender's office and once by defendant's counsel. See
Transcripts of Interviews, R.302-361.
In these interviews, Valdez claimed to have been at the park on the day of the
stabbing, and described having observed the victim seeking help from various people at
the park to back him up in a confrontation with defendant. Valdez also claimed that the
victim asked Valdez to back him up in confronting defendant, but that Valdez refused
to help him.
In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court found that there
was no reasonable probability that Valdez's proffered testimony would result in a
different verdict, for three reasons: (1) the testimony was cumulative; (2) the testimony
was not credible; and (3) the testimony also supported the prosecution (R. 1255:89,
1256:69-70).4 All of these findings are fully supported by the record.
(1) The court found that the evidence was cumulative. Although Valdez's
testimony supports defendant's contention that the victim was a violent person who
intended to fight defendant (R. 1255:88), that testimony is cumulative because other
evidence in the case had already established that fact, without dispute. "Certainly,

4

The trial court made these findings on the record twice. The court first made
findings when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial at the close of the hearing on
his motion. R. 1255:85-91 (Addendum A). Defendant later renewed his motion for a
new trial in connection with his second sentencing hearing, and the court made
additional findings at that time. R. 1256:67-70 (Addendum B).
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[Valdez's statement] indicates the victim's propensity towards violence. There's been
no indication on the record that anybody thinks the victim did not initiate the
confrontation and the violence." (R. 1256:69). Defendant does not challenge this
finding.
(2) The court found that Valdez's statements were of questionable evidentiary
value. The court found Valdez's statements lacked credibility based upon the fact that
Valdez's observations at the time were unreliable, as he was very sick and looking for a
drug fix at that time. Id. In the interviews, Valdez asserted that he was either sick
because of his addiction to cocaine, or had just taken cocaine and was under the
influence of the drug at the time of the incidents he described (R.331, 325, 343, 349).
Indeed, Valdez stated that he was so sick from his need for a fix that he was unable to
drive his car, and had to take the drug while still at the park (R.349).
The court's finding that Valdez's statements lacked credibility is also supported
by significant contradictions in the story Valdez told over the course of the three
interviews. For example, during the first interview, Valdez explained that he first
heard about the stabbing when he returned to the park one hour after it happened, and
that he was not told of the identity of those involved (R.329-30). In this first
interview, Valdez also claimed that he was not told the identity of the victim or of
defendant's involvement until months later, and then related in some detail his
conversation with defendant, where he was surprised to learn that defendant was
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involved (R.330-31). In the second interview, Valdez stated that he did not find out
about the stabbing at all until the next day, and gave specific details about being at the
Salvation Army when he heard about it (R.317-18). In the third interview, Valdez
changed his story again, this time relating specific details about having been told the
names of defendant and the victim when he returned to the park on the day of the
stabbing (R.345).
There are other inconsistencies. Valdez gives word-for-word descriptions of his
conversation with the victim that vary widely. At one point, he states that the victim
wanted "a hand on beating [defendant] up" (R.335). During another interview, he
claims that the victim told him that he was going to kill defendant (R.343), and yet
described his surprise at learning that there had been a killing, since he "did not know
that there was going to be a killing going down" (R.317). At one point in the
interviews, Valdez states that the victim spoke to him in Spanish (R. 335); later, Valdez
claims not to have been able to understand the victim because of the victim's poor
English (R.339-40). In one exchange, Valdez even stated that the victim never spoke
to him directly, describing how the victim approached and spoke in Spanish to someone
standing next to him (R.314). Although Valdez asserted at one point that he believed
the victim intended to kill defendant (R.319), he also asserted several times that he did
not consider the victim to be dangerous because the victim would never actually follow
through on a threat or use a weapon (R.311, 332, 341).
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(3) The court found that Valdez's testimony, if believed, would support the
State's case. In addition to Valdez's credibility problems, the court found that
Valdez's statement "cuts two ways" (R. 1256:68-69). In the interviews, Valdez
repeatedly discounted the possibility that the victim was a serious threat, and disavows
any implication that the victim was part of an organized group or gang that the victim
could rely upon.
Valdez described the victim as having no "heart;" he had seen the victim "throw
down" a few people, but it was just punches being thrown back and forth, and the
victim never took a confrontation further than that (R.332). Valdez had confronted the
victim on a previous occasion, and had slapped him a few times (R.330, 311). Valdez
stated that although the victim might have been armed, he was not concerned about that
because "nine times out of ten them guys over there ain't got the heart to pull it out"
(R.311).
Valdez's statements also provide a vivid refutation of a basic factual assertion
relied upon by the defense at trial: that the victim was part of a violent, organized
group that would target people in the park. Defendant's self defense theory was based
upon his assertion that he believed the victim was part of a loyal gang of drug dealers
who acted together in attacking anyone who crossed them.
To the contrary, Valdez described the victim as going from person to person in
the park, looking for someone, anyone, to "back him" in confronting defendant
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(R.335). Indeed, the fact that the victim would seek help from someone like Valdez
significantly undercuts defendant's assertion that the victim could rely on a loyal
following in confronting defendant. Valdez was openly hostile to the victim (R.308),
had slapped the victim around a week or two prior to this incident (R. 309-311), did not
speak the victim's language well (R.339-40), and was even a good friend of defendant's
(R.340-41).
Valdez's statements also constitute a direct refutation of defendant's other "new
evidence." In contrast to the speculative Gilbert Affidavit regarding the influence of
gangs at the park and the inference of gang membership that defendant now seeks to
draw from the victim's tattoos, Valdez asserted that
[the victim] didn't hang around with certain individuals such as a clique or
anything he just like they are all there doing their thing trying to compete
against each other to see which one can sell the dope the fastest.
(R.342). Valdez's description of the drug trade at Pioneer Park as not being controlled
by any one group is consistent with the testimony of the state's rebuttal witness, Officer
Robert Robinson, who testified that no single group controlled the drug trade in the
park, and that drug dealers operated individually or in small groups of associates
(R. 1253:262-64).
Ultimately, Valdez's description of the victim's efforts to recruit backup for his
confrontation with defendant complements the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
who saw the stabbing. Although defendant may have been successful in recruiting two
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people to back him up, Valdez's description implies that these people would not have
had any personal interest in the confrontation, and would therefore not have
participated in the victim's initial confrontation. It is also reasonable to conclude,
based on Valdez's description, that these recruits would not have been eager to put
themselves in danger by attacking defendant while he was armed. In fact, the trial
testimony confirms this conclusion; the eyewitnesses testified that the two men who
accompanied the victim never displayed a weapon and never approached defendant
(R.1251:263,1253:169). When the victim and defendant confronted each other, these
men did not make a move to join the fight (R. 1252:189). Even when defendant stabbed
the victim, these men did not make a move against defendant, and merely went to the
victim to rifle through his pockets (R. 1252:208). Thus, Valdez's testimony strongly
supports the State's case by providing an explanation for the passive behavior of the
victim's "backup:" they had no personal stake in the confrontation.
Given the apparent value of Valdez's testimony for the prosecution, it is
questionable whether Valdez would even be called as a witness for the defense if a new
trial were held. Accordingly, the trial court properly considered the proposed Valdez
testimony to be of limited value to defendant. See Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949,
952 (Utah App. 1998) ("the weight to be given [new] testimony is for the trial judge
passing on the motion for new trial to determine . . . * A new trial should not be granted
on the ground of newly discovered evidence unless the evidence is of such materiality
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that it would be likely to produce a different result upon re-trial/") (quoting State v.
Norman, 652 P.2d 683, 689 (Kan. 1982)); Foxley v. Foxley, 801 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah
App. 1990) ("For newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, the evidence must
have a probative weight sufficient to have a probable effect on the result."). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the proposed testimony of Julian Valdez
would not likely change the jury's verdict.5
Testimony of Gilmar Pinelo. The trial court refused to grant a new trial based
upon alleged statements of Gilmar Pinelo regarding his participation in the stabbing
because defendant failed to present any admissible evidence of these statements
(R. 1255:88). The only evidence offered by defendant with regard to Pinelo is
defendant's own hearsay description of a conversation with him. Whiteman Affidavit,
1 6 (R.784-85), Supplemental Affidavit, 11 8-9 (R.1014). On appeal, defendant does
not dispute the trial court's ruling that defendant's hearsay description of his

5

Although the court assumed that the testimony was "new evidence," there is
some indication that this is not "new" evidence because defendant should have been
able to discover this testimony prior to trial. In his interview with defendant's counsel,
Valdez said that defendant told him that defendant remembered seeing Valdez at the
park on the day of the stabbing (R.347). See State v. Schqffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1186
(Utah 1981) ("'New evidence' . . . is not evidence newly remembered after trial, or
evidence available to defendant but not obtained by him prior to the time of trial.")
(citations omitted).
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conversation with Pinelo was inadmissible evidence and therefore could not be relied
upon in support of a motion for a new trial. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 17-18.
In addition, the only admissible evidence regarding possible testimony by Pinelo
directly contradicts defendant's assertion of what Pinelo told him. In response to
defendant's hearsay statements concerning Pinelo, the State offered a transcript of an
interview with Pinelo in which he disavowed any knowledge of the stabbing, stating
that he was not in the park at the time (R.912).6 The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the testimony of Gilmar Pinelo would not likely change the
jury's verdict.
C. Disposition of Robert Young's DUI charge.
Defendant argues that new evidence exists that the State offered leniency on a
DUI charge pending against Robert Young in exchange for his testimony at defendant's
trial. Brief of Appellant, p. 19. However, defendant has not provided any evidence,
new or otherwise, of an agreement between Young and the State concerning Young's
testimony. Indeed, any implication that such a deal was ever made is directly
contradicted by the evidence.

6

The parties stipulated that "the documents and the affidavits and the statements
would be proffered testimony for the purposes of the hearing [on the motion for a new
trial.]" (R. 1255:4). Under this stipulation, the interview transcripts of Pinelo and
Valdez were considered as admissible testimony at the hearing.
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Young was charged with DUI in June, 1993 (R.823). Prior to defendant's trial,
Young approached the prosecutor and requested leniency in exchange for his testimony.
The prosecutor refused this request, but offered to call the Salt Lake City prosecutor's
office arid let them know of Young's cooperation if he appeared and testified at
defendant's trial (R.878). This request, and the prosecutor's response, was disclosed to
defendant's counsel prior to trial. Moffat Affidavit, 116 (R.888). Defendant's counsel
chose not to impeach Young with this information because counsel felt that the jury
would only have been offended by such an attack on an uninvolved witness. Id. at t
17.
A month after the trial, in October 1993, Young entered a no contest plea to the
DUI and was sentenced by the court to pay a $1,110.00 fine and perform community
service. There is no evidence that the prosecutor in this case communicated with the
court in connection with Young's sentencing, and defendant does not argue that the
disposition of Young's case was in any way unusual. See R.878-89.
One year later, Young had paid the fine, but there was no record of his having
completed his required community service hours (R.824). As a result, an additional
$300.00 was added to Young's fine, and his probation was extended (R.825). In May,
1995, the court determined that Young's probation period had expired, and the case
was therefore cleared, even though the additional $300.00 had not been paid. Id. It is
this (apparently unsolicited) clearing of Young's case without payment of the additional
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fine, almost two years after defendant's trial, that defendant now characterizes as new
evidence of a "deal" between Young and the prosecutor. Defendant has not presented
any evidence that the closing of Young's case was in any way unusual or that the
prosecutor in defendant's case even had any knowledge of it.
Accordingly, there is no evidence, new or otherwise, of an agreement for
leniency in exchange for Young's testimony. The only action taken by the prosecutor
with regard to Young's testimony was to reject Young's request for leniency, and this
was known to defendant prior to trial.
POINT II
DEFENDANT MADE A STRATEGIC DECISION NOT TO
REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER, AND THE COURT DID NOT
ERR BY ACCEPTING THAT DECISION
Defendant argues that he was entitled to a lesser-included instruction on the
offense of manslaughter. Brief of Appellant, pp. 23-27. Indeed, the trial court found
that, if requested, such an instruction would have been given (R. 1255:85). However,
defendant did not request a manslaughter instruction, and the court did not commit
error in accepting his strategic choice not to provide the jury with the option of
convicting him of the lesser crime.
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A. Defendant did not request a lesser-included instruction.
Defendant asserts that he formally submitted a requested instruction on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter at the conclusion of the trial.n Brief of
Appellant, p. 26. To the contrary, the trial court found that defendant's counsel
"specifically waived" the giving of such an instruction (R. 1255:86). Defendant's
assertion that he requested the instruction is also explicitly contradicted by the record.
In support of his assertion that he formally requested a lesser-included
instruction at the conclusion of the trial, defendant cites only to a proposed jury
instruction submitted to the court prior to trial, an instruction that only directs the jury
to find defendant guilty of an undescribed lesser-included offense if it finds that there is
reasonable doubt as to the severity of the crime proven (R. 113). This proposed
instruction does not describe the elements of the crime of manslaughter, and is so vague
as to be insufficient, of itself, to instruct the jury with regard to finding a lesserincluded offense in this case. In addition, these instructions submitted by defendant
before trial were preliminary requests, subject to a later decision as to their
appropriateness. See R.103 (instruction submitted in anticipation of possibility that
defendant would decide not testify).
On the second day of trial, defendant had not yet submitted all of his proposed
instructions, including his proposed instruction on self-defense. Defendant had also not
submitted an instruction on imperfect self-defense, which would form the factual basis
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for a lesser-included manslaughter offense (R. 1252:145). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(3)(a)(ii) (1999) (murder is reduced to manslaughter if defendant has a reasonable
belief in a legal justification). Defendant's counsel informed the court that defendant
was still considering whether to request a lesser-included instruction on manslaughter.
Id. ("Mr. Moffat: We don't know if we are going to ask for manslaughter yet, your
honor.").
No such request was ever made. On the morning of the last day of trial, the
court and counsel met to discuss the instructions, and an agreed-upon set of instructions
was prepared and given to the parties to examine (R. 1253:128). During this
conference, the court specifically asked whether defendant wished to request a lesserincluded instruction, and defendant's counsel told the court that he did not. Moffat
Affidavit, p. 3 (R.888). The court later addressed the parties on the record, and asked
if there were any objections to the instructions, including any objections to the court's
refusal to give any requested instructions. In response, defendant's counsel stated that
he had no objection to the instructions, with the exception of the court's refusal to
include defendant's proposed instruction on reasonable doubt (R. 1253:129).
Defendant's failure to object to the jury instructions waives any challenge to the
instructions on appeal. State v. Perdue 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991)
(" Where no grounds are apparent from the text of the instruction and no objection is
stated, the objection is presumed waived."); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) ("No party may
28

assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed . . . Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.").
Indeed, in this case, the exception to the waiver rule allowing for appellate
review of the jury instructions "to avoid a manifest injustice" does not apply because
defendant explicitly rejected the court's invitation to submit a lesser-included
instruction. "[T]he manifest injustice exception has no application in cases in which the
defendant invited the very error complained of on appeal." State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT
App 30, 1 22, 975 P.2d 469 ("This Court will not predicate error upon the failure to
give an instruction when the party alleging the error failed to offer the instruction.")
(quoting State v. Swan, 928 P.2d 933, 935 (Mont. 1996)). See also State v. Blubaugh,
904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995) ("Because defendant failed to object to the
instruction at trial, we can reach the issue only to avoid manifest injustice. However,
the manifest injustice exception has no application in cases in which the defendant
invited the very error complained of on appeal.") (citing State v. Medina, 738 P.2d
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)) (court refused to consider manifest injustice exception where
defense counsel stated she had no objection to the instruction). Defendant declined to
request a lesser-included instruction on manslaughter, and cannot now complain that the
trial court accepted his strategic decision.
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Defendant argues that his failure to request a lesser-included instruction should
not constitute a waiver of his right to have such an instruction given because "the
waiver by Defendant must be made distinctly and on the record." Brief of Appellant,
p. 28. Defendant fails to cite any authority in support of this proposition. Indeed,
defendant's contention is contradicted by Rule 19(c) and the case law cited above
explicitly holding that defendant's failure to propose a jury instruction constitutes a
waiver of it. Kiriluk, at] 22. A trial court obviously cannot be expected to obtain an
explicit, personal, on-the-record waiver from a defendant as to every possible jury
instruction that the defendant could, but did not, request.
B. The trial court did not err in accepting defendant's decision not to
give a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense.
Even if the trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense at
defendant's request is reviewable, the court did not commit error. Defendant asserts
that the trial court erred because "language from our courts and others suggests that a
criminal defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction, whether requested or not,
so long as the evidence provides a rational basis for such an instruction." Brief of
Appellant, p. 29. Defendant here argues that, even in the face of a defendant's
decision not to ask for a lesser-included instruction, the trial court must ignore that
decision and include the instruction anyway.
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This argument was explicitly rejected long ago. In State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d
618, 621 (Utah 1955), the court held that a defendant has a choice whether to seek a
lesser-included instruction, and the court has no independent duty to give the instruction
if not requested.
A highly skilled advocate, conscientiously and deliberately believing it to
be of benefit to his client, may not request and may even resist,
instructions on intermediate offenses, or may request an instruction
precluding instructions on lesser offenses . . . being convinced that the
state has not proved the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and
not wishing to subject his client to the possibility of conviction of some
other offense. Besides, it would seem palpably unreasonable to allow one
to sit by and deliberately refuse to request instructions as to lesser
offenses, with positive assurance of another trial if his client be convicted
of the charge against him. The great weight of authority is to the effect
that if no request is made for instructions on lesser offenses, and none is
given, such failure to instruct is not reviewable as a matter of right on
appeal. We subscribe to such view.
Id. at 621-22. Since Mitchell, Utah cases have consistently recognized that it is a
defendant's choice, as a matter of trial strategy, to either request or refuse a lesserincluded instruction. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982) ("on occasion,
an accused may choose not to request instructions on lesser included offenses as a
matter of trial strategy, usually in the belief that he can defeat the greater charge, but
might not be able to defeat a lesser included offense."); State v. Valdez, %52 P.2d 53,
54 (Utah 1967) ("Sometimes as a matter of trial strategy a defendant desires to have his
case submitted to the jury upon the basis of the greater offense only and to risk 'all or
nothing' on the outcome.").
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The trial court did not err in accepting defendant's strategic decision not to give
the jury the option of convicting him of a lesser offense. "Having made his choice, he
is bound by it; and he cannot thus elect to make no request as to a lesser included
offense, with a reservation in mind that if he is convicted he can claim error and obtain
a new trial." Valdez, 432 P.2d at 54.
C. The decision not to request a lesser-included instruction was a
reasonable strategic choice.
Defendant nevertheless seeks review of this claim by asserting that the decision
not to request a lesser-included instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
Brief of Appellant, p. 34. Defendant assumes, without discussion, that if a lesserincluded instruction is an option, it should always be requested. This argument ignores
. the fact that rejecting a lesser-included instruction is a well-recognized and reasonable
trial strategy. The trial court found that this strategy was reasonable in this case:
As to the lack of proper jury instructions, I'm going to find that
that was appropriate trial tactics, and a reasonable gamble. If the
attorneys in [consultation] with their client thought they were going to
win, if the jury believed Mr. Whiteman's version, they could have
acquitted him of all charges.
Asking for a lesser-included instruction would be fatal or lessen the
chance of an acquittal across the board.
R. 1256:69. The court's finding that this was a reasonable decision, made in
consultation with defendant himself, is supported by the testimony of defendant's trial
counsel. "At the conclusion of the evidence we talked with Defendant about asking for
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a lesser included offense. Defendant thought we were winning and he did not want a
lesser included instruction." Moffat Affidavit, 118 (R.888).7
In considering a claim that counsel was deficient, this Court "will give trial
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions
unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
644 (Utah 1996) (citing Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)); State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) ("we must be persuaded that there was a
'lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions'") (quoting State v.
Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). As stated, the decision not to
request a lesser-included instruction is recognized as a reasonable strategic choice, and
defendant has not provided any basis for questioning it in this case. See State v. Perry,
899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (failure to request lesser-included was proper
trial strategy).

7

Although defendant responded to Moffat's testimony with a supplemental
affidavit denying that he discussed the issue with counsel (R.1013), this assertion is not
credible and was impliedly rejected by the trial court (R. 1256:69). Defendant was
present in court when his counsel informed the court that they were still considering
whether to request a lesser-included instruction (R. 1252:145). Further, Moffat's
affidavit shows that the decision whether to request a lesser-included instruction was
carefully considered, and defendant has failed to show that his counsel for some reason
kept this decision a secret from him.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his
attorney's alleged failure to (1) fully investigate his case, (2) request a lesser-included
instruction, (3) present medical evidence of defendant's mental condition, and (4)
adequately cross-examine certain witnesses. Brief of Appellant, p. 31. To prevail on
this claim, defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was objectively
deficient, and that there exists a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct,
he would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d
638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court rejected defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that defendant's attorneys acted
reasonably in investigating and presenting the defense (R. 1255:87). "[W]hen a trial
court has heard a motion for a new trial based on an ineffective assistance claim, an
appellate court will not set aside the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.n
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990). The record fully supports the trial
judge's finding that defendant's counsel acted reasonably.
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A. No evidence of a failure to investigate exists.
To show that counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct a reasonable
investigation, "defendant must show not only that counsel failed to seek mitigating
evidence, but also that some actually existed to be found." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d
681, 687 (Utah 1997). Further, trial counsel's decisions regarding the investigation of
the case should be reviewed with "a heavy measure of deference to counsel's
judgments." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993).
Defendant argues that his attorneys did not conduct an adequate investigation
because they failed to discover and present evidence of the victim's gang affiliation.
Brief of Appellant, p. 32-33. In rejecting this argument, the trial court found that
"counsel pursued diligently the leads that were presented and the resources that were
available to expend" (R. 1255:887). This finding is fully supported by the record.
At the time of trial, no one was aware of the victim's gang affiliation or of the
significance of the victim's tattoos. Defendant does not provide any evidence that
anyone was aware of the existence of the Surenos prior to the trial, and defendant
himself was unaware of it, even though he acknowledges that he spent a great deal of
time at the park. Defendant did not give his attorneys any information that would have
reasonably led them to investigate gang membership. See Moffat Affidavit, t 9
(R.887) ("Mr. Whiteman did not ask us to investigate the victim's gang affiliation nor
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to investigate street gang activities at the park. . . . Defendant did not tell us anything
about the Surenos gang or that he thought the victim was a member of that gang.").
In considering whether defense counsel has conducted a reasonable investigation,
counsel's actions must be considered in light of the information provided by defendant.
"[T]he reasonableness of investigative decisions critically depends on information the
defendant supplies." Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 286 n.6 (Utah 1995) {citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)). None of the witnesses,
including police officers who patrolled the park and others who spent a great deal of
time at the park, were apparently aware of the alleged existence or influence of the
Surenos gang. Defendant has therefore failed to provide any basis for finding that
defendant's attorneys should have discovered it. "Counsel's actions are usually based,
quite properly, on . . . information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what
investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.8
Defendant also asserts that his attorneys failed to follow up on witness statements
obtained from the prosecutor. Brief of Appellant, p. 33. The record refutes this claim.

8

In any event, defendant's trial counsel presented at trial significant evidence of
the victim's gang association as one of the Hispanic drug dealers in the park, and
additional gang evidence would have been cumulative. See discussion of the gang
evidence, supra at pp. 13-16.
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First, defendant has not provided any evidence that his attorneys failed to follow
up on some reasonable investigative lead. The only evidence of possible additional
testimony cited by defendant is the witness interview transcripts, in which several
witnesses generally describe what happened after the stabbing when defendant ran from
the park. Defendant's counsel obtained copies of all these reports, and followed up on
them.
We received the police reports and copies of the transcripts of the
interviews with certain of the State's witnesses including Bernard Townes
and Charles Drake. We read the reports and the transcripts and listened
to the tape records of these and other witnesses.
We asked our investigator to find and interview many witnesses.
Some of these witnesses were transient and were difficult to locate. We
were not able to locate Bernard Townes although we sent our investigator
to find Townes.
We also interviewed many witnesses and went to the Pioneer Park
ourselves several times investigating the case.
We reviewed the statement of Charles Drake and decided not to
use valuable investigative time interviewing him because he did not see
the stabbing and he only saw the aftermath which were observed by other
more credible witnesses.
Moffat Affidavit, 114-6, 8 (R.886-87). Defendant has submitted no evidence that
would call into question whether his trial counsel made a reasonable effort to
investigate this case. See State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991)
("Nothing in the record establishes that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate
pre-trial investigation."). Indeed, even if defendant had shown that there was a
possible witness that counsel failed to interview, that alone would not imply that
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counsel was ineffective. State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah App. 1993)
("While there may be some remote possibility that such individuals saw the events,
could be located, and would have a different view of what happened than the
eyewitnesses who testified at trial, it is not reasonable to expect trial counsel to try to
locate every possible witness who might have observed the incident, especially from
some distance, in the hope that one of them might provide helpful testimony."). In
short, defendant's attorneys investigated and evaluated the testimony of the available
witnesses before trial, and defendant provides no basis for questioning their judgment.9
See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) ("If counsel believes that
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or harmful, we will not question that
decision in the absence of a showing that counsel's belief was unreasonable. To do so
would be to second-guess counsel's trial strategy.").
Finally, defendant has failed to show that additional investigation by his
attorneys would have yielded significant evidence in his favor. Defendant refers to

9

Defendant also argues that his attorneys should have discovered and presented
the testimony of Gilmar Pinelo and Julian Valdez. Brief of Appellant, p.33. However,
defendant does not explain why his attorneys should have been able to discover these
witnesses before trial when they were not mentioned in any reports, and defendant does
not claim to have given his attorneys any information about them. Defendant also
claims that his attorneys failed to discover that Robert Young was given a lighter
sentence in exchange for his testimony. Id. at p. 34. As explained above, supra at pp.
24-26, there is no evidence of such an exchange, and defendant does not claim that this
deal took place until almost two years after the trial.
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several possible witnesses mentioned in the police reports, including William Shultz,
Charles Drake, and Bernard Townes, but does not provide evidence of what their
testimony would be or argue why that testimony would have changed the result of the
trial. "[A] defendant 'cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test simply by
identifying unexplored avenues of investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that further investigation would have yielded sufficient
information to alter the outcome of his trial.'" State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 265 (Utah
App. 1995) (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523-24 (Utah 1994)). See also
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant's claim of inadequate
investigation fails because defendant failed to show what evidence would have been
obtained upon further investigation).
B. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to present evidence of
defendant's alleged mental deficiencies.
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to prove that
defendant suffered from mental and emotional "deficiencies." Brief of Appellant, p.
34. Defendant asserts that he suffered from "bi-polar disorders," and that proof of this
condition would have helped his case "by showing that he did not have the necessary
intent for homicide." Id. However, defendant has not provided any evidence to
support this argument, either to show that he actually had some medical or
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psychological condition that would have formed the basis for a viable defense, or to
show that his attorneys should have known of this condition.
In making this argument, defendant relies upon an evaluation letter to a disability
claims examiner from a psychologist reporting on some testing results. Although
certain diagnoses are listed, there is nothing in this document to support a finding that
this information has any relevance to defendant's state of mind at the time of the
stabbing, let alone that his mental condition would have formed the basis for an
acquittal. As noted above, when arguing that counsel was ineffective for failure to
investigate, defendant has the burden to show not only that there was some avenue of
investigation that counsel failed to explore, but also that the additional investigation
would have provided significant evidence likely to have resulted in an acquittal. Price,
909 P.2d at 265. The evaluation letter now provided by defendant does not meet this
burden; it is not admissible evidence, and the diagnostic terms it mentions do not
themselves provide any support for a finding that defendant lacked the mental state
required for the offense.
In any event, defendant has failed to show that his attorneys acted improperly.
Defendant's counsel asserted that he did not recall having seen the report or discussing
it with defendant. Moffat Affidavit, 113 (R.888). Further, defendant's counsel stated
that even if he had been aware of the report, it would not have affected the presentation
of defendant's case, because "[t]he contents of Dr. Grant's report are inconsistent with
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our theory of self-defense." Id. At trial, defense counsel attempted to portray
defendant as having acted reasonably under a serious threat of harm. This was a
reasonable defense strategy, which would not have been aided by evidence that
defendant was mentally unstable in some (still unknown) way. Defendant has not
presented any evidence or argument that a defense based upon a mental deficiency
would have been the only reasonable strategic choice.10
C. Defendant has failed to point out any deficiencies in his counsel's
cross examination of prosecution witnesses.
Defendant asserts that his attorneys failed to adequately cross examine
prosecution witnesses. Brief of Appellant, p. 35. In support of this argument,
defendant points to alleged deficiencies in cross-examining two witnesses, but fails to
support his assertion with evidence of specific inconsistencies in the testimony of these
witnesses.
Defendant argues that the cross-examination of Elizabeth Woods was deficient
because counsel failed to point out an alleged inconsistency with Woods' preliminary
hearing testimony. Defendant asserts that he remembers Woods testifying at the
preliminary hearing that she saw defendant push the victim back with both hands on the
shoulders during their confrontation (R.786). However, in making this argument,
10

Defendant also asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce this
evidence of mental deficiencies at sentencing. Brief of Appellant, p. 37. However,
this evidence was, in fact, introduced in evidence and argued at defendant's second
sentencing hearing (R. 1256:8-9).
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defendant does not provide evidence of what Woods' preliminary hearing testimony
was, and does not cite to any trial testimony which would be inconsistent even with
defendant's memory of what Woods testified to at the preliminary hearing.
In addition, even if defendant had made a showing that Woods' trial testimony
omitted the incident that defendant now recalls from her preliminary hearing testimony,
there is no reason to believe that cross-examination on this point would have turned to
defendant's advantage, let alone that such would have had a likely effect on the verdict.
Assuming that defendant's memory of the preliminary hearing testimony is correct, and
Woods testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant had pushed the victim during
their confrontation, it would be poor defense strategy to remind the witness of this
testimony at trial, thereby prompting the witness to describe additional aggressive
behavior by defendant against the victim. See Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 876 ("The
decision of whether to pursue a certain line of questioning is entrusted to the judgment
of counsel.")
The only other allegation defendant makes regarding his attorneys' failure to
cross examine witnesses is that uMr. Young had apparently made previous statements
to the police and his inconsistencies were not presented at trial." Brief of Appellant, p.
35. Defendant fails to cite to the record to show that any such prior statements exist,
let alone that these alleged statements were in some significant way inconsistent with
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Young's trial testimony. As in Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 876, "[defendant] has not
demonstrated what a more extensive cross-examination would have uncovered.n
D. Defendant was not denied a fair trial.
Acknowledging his inability to meet the requirements of Strickland for making a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant argues that this court should
simply ignore the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test in this case, and cites
to State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 (Utah App. 1997). Brief of Appellant, p. 38.
However, the Classon court did not require a strict showing of actual prejudice because
in that case, the defendant was essentially denied any representation at all. 935 P.2d at
533 ("a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel when, as in this case, a
lawyer is requested, but no lawyer accepts actual responsibility for preparation and
defense of the case.") {citing Kryger v. Turner, 479 P.2d 477, 480 (Utah 1971) ("The
right of an accused to have counsel is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an
appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests no real concern about the
interests of the accused."). Defendant has not made any such argument in this case,
and cannot do so, as his representation at trial by two attorneys, Mark Moffat and
Richard Mauro, could in no way be described as a "sham or pretense.w
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POINT IV
THE STATE DID NOT FAIL TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to due process by not
disclosing evidence that might have been exculpatory. Brief of Appellant, p. 39. To
prevail on this claim, defendant must show that the prosecutor failed to disclose
evidence favorable to the defense, and that this undisclosed evidence is "constitutionally
material," i.e., that there is "a 'reasonable probability' that the result of the proceeding
would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed." State v. Bakalov, 1999
UT 45, 1 39, 979 P.2d 799 {quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985)).
Defendant's argument on this issue fails because he has not identified any
evidence of any kind, whether "constitutionally material" or not, that the prosecutor
failed to disclose prior to trial. The record reflects that the prosecutor provided
defendant with access to every witness statement and report in the case (R.51-55).
Indeed, defendant's trial counsel acknowledged that he examined the witness statements
produced in connection with this case, along with the reports produced concerning the
examination of the victim's body. Moffat Affidavit, 114, 12 (R.886-87). Defendant
does not point to a single fact or bit of evidence, whether in the prosecutor's file or in
his mind, that was not disclosed before trial.
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Instead of identifying facts that the prosecutor failed to disclose, defendant cites
only to facts that were not known to anyone before trial, and even to speculative facts
that are still unknown. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly withheld the
following items:
(1) evidence of the victim's association with the Surenos gang as shown
by his tattoos;
(2) the name and statement of Gilmar Pinelo;
(3) other statements from eyewitnesses such as William Schultz, Bernard
Townes, and Charles Drake; and
(4) Robert Young's DUI charge and favorable treatment in exchange for
his testimony.
Brief of Appellant, p. 40-41. The only actual evidence in this list is the testimony later
. submitted by defendant that makes a connection between the victim's "SUR" tattoo and
the Surenos gang. Defendant does not allege that this connection was known by the
prosecution before trial, and nothing in the record implies that anyone was aware of the
Surenos gang at the time of trial.
As for the witnesses cited (Pinelo, Schultz, Townes, and Drake), defendant does
not point out any evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose a statement or report.
Defendant does not allege that the prosecutor knew the identity of Pinelo, and the
record does not even support defendant's assertion that Pinelo had any relevant
testimony to offer. Further, defendant does not cite to any alleged statements of
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Schultz, Townes or Drake, and, as noted, his trial counsel acknowledged that the
prosecutor provided access to all witness statements. Moffat Affidavit, 14 (R.886).
Finally, as to Robert Young's DUI charge, there is no dispute that the prosecutor
disclosed to defendant the fact that Young had requested leniency in exchange for his
testimony, and that the prosecutor had denied this request. Moffat Affidavit, 5 16
(R.888). Also, there is no evidence that any "deal" was ever made with Young with
regard to his testimony. See supra, pp. 24-26.
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that his right to due process was
denied.
POINT V
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE HE FAILS TO MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS CONVICTION
Defendant asserts that his conviction is not supported by the evidence,
questioning how the jury could have convicted him in light of the evidence he presented
in support of his self-defense theory. However, in making his argument that the
evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to convict, defendant fails to meet his
burden to marshal the evidence.
"The burden is heavy on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant 'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then
demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient
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to support the verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 Utah App. 305 125, 989 P.2d 503
(citation omitted) {quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)).
Reversal occurs "only when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable
that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant
committed the crime." Strain, 885 P.2d at 819 {quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d
540, 543 (Utah 1994) (additional quotations omitted)). See also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.").
In this case, defendant has wholly failed to marshal the evidence supporting his
conviction. Instead of listing, "in comprehensive and fastidious order," the evidence
presented by the State in support of his conviction, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), defendant recites only his version of
selected evidence allegedly supporting his theory of self defense. Brief of Appellant,
pp. 43-45.
The evidence supporting defendant's conviction includes the fact that he
retrieved his knife on the morning of the stabbing in order to take care of a "problem"
(R. 1251:179), and that defendant was aggressive in dealing with the victim in their
confrontations, shouting and exchanging threats with him (R. 1252:160, 165, 168-69).
The evidence also showed that defendant stood up and approached the victim with his
fists raised to engage in mutual combat (R. 1251:224, 1253:174), and that the victim
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was alone and unarmed at the time of their confrontation (R. 1251:263). Most
significantly, the evidence showed that when defendant came up with his knife after
being hit by the victim, the victim backed away with his empty hands raised, and
defendant took several steps forward to stab him in the chest (R. 1251:216, 226). The
jury obviously accepted this evidence that, at the time he stabbed the victim, defendant
was either not in imminent danger of serious injury or death, and/or that he was
engaged in mutual combat. See Jury Instruction Nos. 22, 24 (R.199, 201) (instructions
on self defense and mutual combat).
Defendant has not met his burden to marshal the evidence. "He merely recites
his own version of the facts, and presents none of the evidence supporting the
convictions." Shepherd, 1999 Utah App. 305 at 5 25. This Court should not consider
his insufficiency claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ] 3 day of March, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

H WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen, I want to note for the

2

record, I think that the effort you have done on

3

Mr. Whiteman1s behalf is extraordinary in terms of being able

4

to pull a lot of different things together and to assist

5

Mr. Whiteman in presenting the issues.

6

has struggled for many months now trying to put in the legal

7

format his concerns and pull these things up. And I

8

appreciate the amount of time you have spent doing that as

9

well as the quality of the work that you have done.

10

I know Mr. Whiteman

Let me state for the record as well that I feel a

11

little bit handicapped ruling on post trial motions for a

12

trial that I didn't conduct.

13

some of what ordinarily is fairly broad discretion that a

14

trial judge has in terms of granting post trial motions.

15

And so that, I think, may limit

Let me work through the six items that have been

16

raised.

17

instruction, I am going to find that that instruction was

18

appropriately given and it was not an error to giving the

19

instruction that Judge Murphy did.

20

With the inadequate or the imperfect self-defense

With the lesser-included instruction, I am going

21

to find that if Mr. Whiteman had asked for that instruction,

22

he certainly would have been entitled to that.

23

testimony alone would have been sufficient to provide an

24

evidentiary basis for the giving of such an instruction.

25

that it is not plain error to not give that instruction,

I think his

But

11

request itJ

>i 11 '.Il

i

: 1.1i i Il

"i i1 IIIi(J11)

iI

( "i

2

specifically waived by attorneys on the record when they are

3

asked to review the instructions and they had exceptions to

4
5

t believe the state of
the law is such that the Court can give a lesser-included

I

defendant and certainly

7

not when they waive the instruction and the prosecutor is not

II

asking

instruct

9

In terms of number three, the ineffective

10

assistance of counsel, given the last two or three years, the

11

ineffective assistance of counsel, I think if you look at the

10

situation that w e see *- the community at large, not just the
issue • I th ii n l :::: there

endency of the community to

view ineffective assistance of counsel as anything less than

Mr. Simpson clearly had enough money that they spent enormous
i

defendant.
And
20

reGO

g n £ 2 e that that places then

defendants without sufficient means at a disadvantage when
compared to somebody who has unlimited resources.

But I

22

don't believe the state of the law requires that all avenues

23

be exhausted, but instead that the reasonable information
11 l'iifirl i"! presented In

25

I .'iI,lowed iif: i xp - ::: n, • tha I: M .1 tnesses III)

interviewed, that the logical conclusions of what people say

1

are weighed in terms of a trial strategy.

2

I think the record demonstrates that counsel did

3

meet the objective standard of reasonableness.

4

was a coherent trial strategy centered around a theory of

5

self-defense. A great deal of effort and time was spent

6

presenting to the jury that Pioneer Park was not a safe

7

environment.

8

activity and the people and the groups that frequented the

9

park, that there was a higher incidence of violence.

10

That there

That there are dangers inherent in the drug

That

people weren't safe.

11

There is certainly available hindsight that the

12

information about gangs, in light of what we know now, might

13

have been presented a little differently —

14

information about the tatoo, the Surenos identification with

15

the gangs. But I am going to find that counsel pursued

16

diligently the leads that were presented and the resources

17

that were available to expend.

18

surely the

The fourth avenue, the mitigation evidence, the

19

exculpatory evidence, the Surenos tatoo and so forth, if

20

there were evidence that the prosecutor or the investigator

21

in the case knew the Surenos tatoo and did not disclose that

22

and withheld that, knew that the tatoo was a label worn by

23

gang members and did not disclose that, I think that would

24

have been a violation of the exculpatory evidence that's

25

required.

But I don't think that the law requires that what

any individual officer knew is attributable to what the
'"

proseci

3

showing of collusion or something else.

4

prosecution team

5

had reasonably before them and not what somebody else in the

6

gang unit or somebody else may have knot

^

find that the exculpatory evidence was not improperly

8

withheld from the defense team.

9

earn knew without some
" think the

be charged

«*iedge that they

The most troubling p^rt of the motions that have
been presented though in my mind is the new evidence.
testimony but that gives me less

12

concern.

Mr. Whiteman has made representations about what
knew • But

I
l

• > t "il i

, 1

1 ,• i» j > r e s *«• •»<

I 11 ! "'•y

14

indication that Pinelo is willing or has in the past

15

presented evidence that would I, "i admissM'i" •• " '

16

about his role in striking Mr. Whiteman with a fence post n

17

in backing up Mr. Lopezf or Mi • Gomez. And

18

clear indication of admissible Evidence, that's not something

19

that I am willing to grant a new trial on.

20

I.HMIMI

1

,| l

'

Il

*'k

.u»e

With Mr. Valdez's testimonyf his statement about

21

the recruitment, about the threat in the park# about

22

Mi

23

weigh both ways.

24

contention that

25

bodily harm to Mr. Whiteman.

i II if r lull I'l iii il 1 r i i I

threat, those things can certainly

It would certainly support Mr. Whitemanfs
to do serious

1

On the down sider Mr. Valdez's credibility

2

certainly can be questioned by the terms of the interviews.

3

He was sick, looking for a fix to get better. And while I

4

would have admitted the evidence at trial if I had been the

5

trial judge and Mr. Valdez were available to testify, I have

6

to find that I don't believe Mr. Valdez's testimony rises to

7

the level that would properly result in a different verdict.

8

It certainly might, but I don't think the law allows me to

9

set aside a jury verdict on a "mightM and grant a new trial,

10

but it requires instead that there would probably be a

11

different result.

12

trial based upon any new evidence.

So I am going to deny the motion for a new

13

Not for purposes of argument but to clarify things

14

for appeal and to make sure all the avenues are available, is

15

there anything that anybody wants to place on the record?

16

MR. PARKER:

17

THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen?

18

MR. NIELSEN:

19

Not from the State, your Honor.

If the Court will allow me just a

moment, please.

20

THE COURT: Sure.

21

MR. NIELSEN:

I assume that your Honor's ruling

22

with regard to Mr. Valdez's testimony will apparently be the

23

same with regard to the evidence, newly discovered evidence

24

regarding the significance of the tatoos.

25

THE COURT: That's right.

That it's certainly a

1

dangerous place down there. There are dangerous people and

2

violent people there. But it was not information

3

specifically that Mr. Whiteman had at the time of the

4

confrontation.

5

state at the time he was defending himself, and as such would

6

not rise to the level of a probable different result.

7

And as such, it is not relevant to his mental

MR. NIELSEN:

I wanted to make clear with the

8

Court.

Is the Court saying that with regard to this

9

testimony, that it doesn't rise to the level of the

10

reasonable probability, which is the last element, or is your

11

Honor making some other determination with regard to this

12

evidence?

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

THE COURT: No.

Just that it would not result in a

probably different verdict.
MR. NIELSEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

I have

nothing further.
THE COURT: Mr. Whiteman, anything that you want to
put on the record?
THE DEFENDANT:

No. Thank you very much for your

20

time, your Honor. And I do appreciate the opportunity to

21

present this today.

22

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

Separate from that then is your

23

motion to reconsider on the sentencing.

I am going to deny

24

that for a separate reason, and let me state that on the

25

record as well.

90

1

I think it would be inappropriate for me to

2

sentence differently than the judge who presided at the trial

3

and heard the evidence•

I certainly recognize that trial

4

judges have discretion.

But I think, given the fact that I

5

did not hear the evidence, it would be inappropriate for me

6

to impose a sentence different than the judge who did conduct

7

the trial.

8
9
10

So that's a separate ground for why I haven't
granted the resentencing.
as well.

11

Thank you, counsel.

12

MR. PARKER:

13

MR. NIELSEN:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. NIELSEN:

16

And you may want to present that

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you.

Court will be in recess.
Your Honor, may I have a few minutes

with Mr. Whiteman here in the courtroom?

17

THE COURT:

Five minutes is fine. We don't start

18

until 2.

19

give you a chance to talk in the jury room or something.

20

would certainly like to give you a chance to talk with him so

21

you can plan your next steps.

22
23

If you need longer than that, Mr. Nielsen, I will

(This concludes these proceedings at 1:50 p.m.)
* * *
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exception, though, they were concerned about the
reasonable doubt and wanted to challenge that one.
But they passed all the jury instructions that are
here at issue.
This simply is not a case of whether such
things would or would not have made a difference.
The real issue is were those things that defense
counsel did proper preparation and were they
legitimate trial tactics?

And they were.

They

were good decisions that were made after careful
thought and investigation.

And there is no

grounds to go back and revisit this on what
counsel did or did not do.
Again, I'll submit this, your Honor.

I think

the sentence is appropriate of five to life.
THE COURT:

I'm going to note for the record

that the SUR tattoo from victim's arm, I suspect,
probably is -- in fact, I know Mr. Parker is
unwilling to concede that, but I believe the
information would certainly bear out the fact that
that is, in fact, a gang-affiliated tattoo for
Surenos, which is a notorious gang.
little offshoot.

It's not a

It's notoriety exceeds the area

of Pioneer Park.
But I certainly think it may be reasonable
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that that information was not genuinely known and
was not available at the time of the trial.

The

question is, would that tattoo have been enough to
make a difference?
In review of the record, and the jury was
presented with the information that the victim in
this case was a bad guy, had b een involved in
perpetrating violence, they were presented with
evidence of a number of crimes that happened in
Pioneer Park, of the environment that the police
were not the refuge of safety for the people who
lived there.
That given the information that they were
presented with about the victi m and his propensity
towards violence, given the environment that was
explained to the jurors about Pioneer Park, I'm
not convinced that identification which occurred
afterwards was not reasonably available at the
time of trial.

But even if that information had

been available at the trial, I •m not sure that
would have made a difference.
But the affidavits of Mr. Valdez and the
other person who indicated the y had been recruited
by the victim to get Whiteman, that information
cuts two ways.

Certainly, it indicates the

victim's propensity towards violence.

There's

been no indication on the record that anybody
thinks the victim did not initiate the
confrontation and the violence.
But the attempt to recruit people cuts two
ways.

It demonstrates that there was not an

organized system of enforcement where the victim
had automatic help.
some.

He had to go out and find

Although it does show that the victim was

coming after Whlteman, I don't think the evidence
ever disputed the fact that the victim initiated
the violence.
As to the lack of proper jury instructions,
I'm going to find that that was appropriate trial
tactics, and a reasonable gamble.

If the

attorneys in concentration with their client
thought they were going to win, if the jury
believed Mr. Whiteman's version, they could have
acquitted him of all the charges.
Asking for a lesser-included

instruction

would be fatal or lessen the chance of an
acquittal across the board.

I'm going to find

that the new evidence is insufficient to get
around the problem that Mr. Young creates for the
defense•

If there's a witness, the jury sat and judged
his credibility when he said that the victim
backed up with his hands up, open palms, that if
the jury found him a credible witness, the rest of
the information, whether or not the victim was a
gang member, whether or not others were backing
him up, is sufficient to support the jury verdict*
I'm going to deny the request to lower the
sentencing by one charge by one degree.

I'm going

to impose a sentence of five to life on the first
degree murder charge.
I'll note for the record, and to the extent
that it's Mr. Nielsen and his client think it may
be helpful, I would certainly be willing to sign a
recommendation indicating that over the last few
years I've found Mr. Whiteman to be a different
person than the one who appears to have testified
on his own behalf at the trial.
It's been my experience that Mr. Whiteman is
calmer, rational, and appropriate, thoughtful,
certainly vigorous in his defense, but does not
appear to be the same person, the same personality
who was involved in the incident.
And to the extent that that may be helpful to
the board in setting the appropriate review dates,
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I'd certainly make that recommendation,
Mr. Nielsen, if you think that's helpful
MR. NIELSEN:

Thank you.

MR. WHITEMAN:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Anything else that we need to do

to make sure the record is complete?
MR. PARKER:

Not from the State.

MR. WHITEMAN:

You know what, your Honor.

When you said that his hands went up or something
from Robert Earl Young.

He, in that testimony,

said that he had never seen anything that fast
with stabbing.

And what I had testified to was

that it was physics.

When I came up, because he

was getting ready to hit me again, that's when his
hands came up and he went down.

He wasn't backing

up to anything.
THE COURT:
MR. NIELSEN:

Mr. Nielsen?
Your Honor, I appreciate the

Court's indulgence and the Court's time and the
time that has allowed counsel to present this
problem to the Court.

And also to allow

Mr. Whiteman to express himself.
THE COURT:

Well, I think it's inherent on

the system that people be allowed their day in
Court or their days, if that's necessary, to make

sure things are presented.

The system ought not

run in a fashion where somebody's given the short
drift and pushed off to the side.

But they ought

to have a chance to stand up and be listened to.
MR. NIELSEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WHITEMAN:

Thank you, your Honor.

I

appreciate the recommendation to the board.
MR. NIELSEN:

And if the Court please, may I

have just a few minutes with Mr. whiteman either
outside or wherever?
THE COURT:

Sure.

Court will be adjourned.

ADDENDUM C

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
PAUL B. PARKER. Bar No. 5332
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK MOFFAT
Plaintiff,
-vs-

CaseNo.931900809FS

MICHAEL WHITEMAN,

Hon. William A. Thorne, Jr.

Defendant,
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Mark Moffat, being first duly sworn on oath, states and affirms:
1.

I am an attorney employed as an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal Defender

2.

In 1993, Rich Mauro and myself were appointed to represent Michael Whiteman

Assoc.

in case number 931900809FS wherein he was charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder.
3.

Prior to trial, Mr. Mauro and myself conducted an extensive investigation into the

4.

We received the police reports and copies of the transcripts of the interviews with

case.

certain of the State's witnesses including Bernard Townes and Charles Drake. We read the
reoorts and the transcriots and listened to the taoe records of these and other witness.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK MOFFAT
Case No. 93I900809FS
Page No. 2
5.

We asked our investigator to find and interview many witnesses. Some of these

witnesses were transient and were difficult to locate. We were not able to locate Bernard Townes
although we sent our investigator to find Townes.
6.

We also interviewed many witnesses and went to the Pioneer Park ourselves

several times investigating the case.
7.

We went to the location where Elizabeth Woods was when she saw what she later

thought was the stabbing. We took photographs in the same lighting conditions and from the
position she was at and from the location of the stabbing.
8.

We reviewed the statement of Charles Drake and decided not to use valuable

investigative time interviewing him because he did not see the stabbing and he only saw the
aftermath which were observed by other more credible witnesses.
9.

Mr. Whiteman did not askee us to investigate the victim's gang affiliation nor to

investigate gang activities at the park. He did state that Mexican nationals were the group that
worked together and were the ones that he feared would attack him. We talked to witnesses,
other attorneys in our office, and even other clients about the organization at the park. All of
those persons told us that the Mexican nationals were the ones running the distribution of drugs
at the park. Defendant did not tell us anything about the Surenos gang or that he thought the
victim was a member of that gang.
10.

We conducted extensive investigation into the violence at the park and presented

evidence at the trial that the park was an extremely violent place.
11.

We also knew of the victim's violent nature and presented that information at the

trial. We also knew of the victim's many different names.
12.

We knew of the S.U.R. tattoo on the victim but did not attached any significance

to the tattoo nor associate it with any known street gang.
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13.

Defendant did not give us a copy of the reportfromDr. Grant ui even tell us about

the mental health evaluation that Dr. Grant had performed.
14

Defendant acted intelligent and articulate. He acted normal and never displayed

any behavior that led us to believe that he suffered from a mental illness.
15.

We chose a trial strategy of self defense. It was consistent with the evidence and

was in our opinion, Defendant's best hope for success.
16.

Prior to the trial, the prosecutor told me that Robert E. Young had asked for a deal

on DUI, that occurred since the stabbing, in exchange for his testimony but that the prosecutor
had refused the request.
17.

At trial, we chose not to impeach Mr. Young on the request for leniency because

we felt the jury would have been offended by an attack of that sorts on an uninvolved witness.
18.

At the conclusion of the evidence we talked with Defendant about asking for a

lessor included offense. Defendant thought we were winning and he did not want a lessor
included instruction.
19.

Off the record, Judge Murphy asked us if we wanted any lessor included

instructions. I said no.
20.

I read all the proposed jury instructions prior to telling the judge that we had no

objections to all except the court's refusal to give our proposed instruction on reasonable doubt.
Respectfully submitted this

g£

day of December-

, 1996

MARKMOFFAaP
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
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STATE OF UTAH
)
iss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Mark Moffat, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he has read the foregoing
Affidavit and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this £#&

day of December, 1996
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CERTIFICATE QF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of December, 1996 a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Affidavit Of Mark Moffat was delivered to:
CLARK R. NIELSEN
Attorney for Defendant
1160 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
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